This note formulates a large class of matrices whose inverses form an open research problem. It also provides a partial solution as a starting point to tackle the problem in future studies.
Introduction
The formation and stability of a coalition structure (or a partition) is an important and unsettled issue in both sciences and social sciences, such as artificial intelligence (Monderer and Tennenholtz [5] ) and game theory (Shubik [8] ). An obstacle in resolving this issue is that one needs to obtain the analytical expressions of equilibrium payoffs for an arbitrary coalition structure, which often requires one to invert matrices whose inverses are unknown. This note derives a large class of such matrices from industrial organization whose inverses yield the strategic equilibria (or Nash equilibria [6] ) in most linear oligopoly models. Such inverses form an open problem, which includes the analytical expression of the inverse for a general symmetric matrix.
As a starting point to find a complete solution in future studies, the paper provides a partial solution by inverting a non-trivial subset of the derived matrices. This partial solution, previously unavailable in the literature, will be useful to other scholars in their future studies.
1 The rest of the note is organized as follows: Section 2 defines and Section 3 derives the open problem, Sections 4 and 5 provide a partial solution and an application, Section 6 concludes, and the appendix provides proofs.
Description of the problem
Given a partition (or a coalition structure or a set of multi-product firms)
. . , n}, let n i = |S i | denote the cardinality of each coalition S i (or the number of products
, and h 1 the number of its singleton coalitions (i.e., those S i with n i = 1). Then, our main matrix B has [n + h(h + 1)/2 − h 1 ] constants distributed as below: there are h symmetric n i × n i submatrices B ii on the main diagonal whose diagonal entries are a k ( k ∈ S i ) and off-diagonal entries are a constant −b i (i = 1, …, h and n i 2), and h(h − 1) other submatrices B ij = B ji with a dimension of n i ×n j and an identical entry of −c ij = −c ji (j = 1, …, h, j = i). Precisely, the matrix B has the following structure:
whose block submatrices B ii and B ij (i, j = 1, …, h, j = i) are defined as
k=1 n k is the number of rows (or columns) preceding
. . , h and n i
2), and
constants whose economic interpretations are provided in (5) in the next section. 
1 A special case of this partial solution has already been used in several recent studies such as Ishibashi [4] and Wang and Zhao [9] .
